



Memorandum

Subject: ENLISTED CAREER DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM

Date: 8/26/98
1000

From: Master Chief Petty Officer of the Coast Guard

Reply to
Attn. of: G-CMCPO
MCPOCG Patton
7-2397

To: Commandant

Via: (1) Director, Reserve and Training
(2) Assistant Commandant for Human Resources
(3) Chief of Staff
(4) Vice Commandant

1. I am pleased to forward the enclosed report and recommendations for your review and conceptual approval. These items represent the culmination of nearly two years of research and analyses that have yielded a comprehensive plan for an integrated career development program for the enlisted workforce. This Enlisted Career Development Program (ECDP) ties together the results of the Nonrate Workforce Structure Study (NWSS), the Chief Petty Officer Needs Assessment (CPONA) and the Petty Officer Development Initiative (PODI). The ECDP also owes a debt of gratitude to precursory efforts to define the leadership and career needs of our people—Leadership Workgroups I and II in particular. These studies exemplify our commitment to *prepare* our enlisted workforce to *perform* well.
2. As the enclosed report indicates, these analyses were not originally conceived as sequential building blocks for enlisted career development. But in the course of conducting these studies, the teams involved recognized that their work offered such an opportunity and they seized the initiative to build a framework for a cradle-to-grave career development program for the largest segment of our workforce—the men and women of the enlisted corps. As the senior enlisted member of this organization, I am proud to sponsor what I believe will be one of the most sweeping, influential and effective leadership and career development initiatives in the history of our organization.
3. I would particularly note the successful application of Human Performance Technology (HPT) principles and tools in the development of this program. I cannot imagine that any other methodology would have better served both the teams and the Coast Guard in providing a structured approach to capture performance mandates, expectations, assessments and systemic influences—all of which are essential to prescribe a complete and complementary set of interventions that will better prepare the enlisted workforce from accession to advancement to chief petty officer.

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4. This program proposal is the hard work of a multitude of individuals throughout the Coast Guard who have devoted themselves to improving our organization by meeting the needs of its enlisted people. The stamps of all these members—representing diverse paygrades, ratings, operational, support and engineering communities, and demographics—are left within these recommendations.
5. There is a principal core group, however, that merits special recognition as those who truly brought it all together and made the difference between success and failure. They well deserve the gratitude they will undoubtedly receive from our leadership and from future generations of enlisted members at every level. I would like to formally acknowledge the following key players:

LCDR Chris Hall—COMDT (G-WTT)—Primary Performance Consultant
 CDR Mark Rutherford—COMDT (G-WTT)
 LCDR Don Triner—CGC ELM (formerly assigned to LDC)
 LCDR Don Robison—TRACEN Cape May
 MCPO Sandra O'Toole—CPO Academy (East) (formerly assigned to G-WTL)
 YNCS Alex Keenan—COMDT (G-WTL)

6. Enclosure (1) to this memo provides a summary of the ECDP and its component studies and an additional enclosure to the summary provides a listing of recommendations associated with the ECDP. As our late and great chief petty officer Alex Haley said, we should “find the good and praise it”; these studies and recommendations, I believe, illustrate that we’re truly meeting the needs of our enlisted workforce. Strong in the conviction of your credo that “*Preparation Equals Performance*,” I am convinced that the ECDP will provide lasting benefits to the organization and to our enlisted members who comprise 80% of our Coast Guard population.
7. I respectfully request your careful consideration and approval of this proposal. Immediately upon approval, I will take steps working in concerted efforts with COMDT (G-WT), to establish a dedicated Headquarters Implementation Team for all ECDP implementation efforts. This team will be charged with complete oversight, coordination, and integration of all ECDP recommendations approved for implementation. The Performance Consulting Division (G-WTT-1), having served as overall planner, coordinator, and leader of the ECDP analyses, will develop a charter for

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7. (Cont'd) the team, complete with resource requirements needed to implement approved recommendations. I strongly recommend that this team be placed under the immediate direction of the Vice Commandant due to the organization-wide impact and activities related to this implementation project.

VINCENT W. PATTON, III

Encl: (1) ECDP Executive Summary and Recommendations

G-WT
1000
19 Nov 98

FIRST ENDORSEMENT on MCPOCG memo 1000 of 26 Aug 98

From: Director, Reserve and Training
To: Commandant
Via: (1) Assistant Commandant for Human Resources
(2) Chief of Staff

Subj: ENLISTED CAREER DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM

1. I am pleased that we are finally at a place where we can begin to implement what I believe will be outstanding improvements to the way in which we support our enlisted people in building successful and productive careers of Coast Guard service. Since November of 1996, the Training and Performance staff has played an instrumental role in initiating and leading the various analyses that comprise the ECDP. I commend MCPOCG Patton for stepping forward to sponsor this program—this is essential in presenting the ECDP to the Coast Guard as a career development program built by enlisted members for enlisted members.

2. Action is already in progress on many of the items; hence, your approval/disapproval is not necessary. These items include:

- a. Curriculum development for
 - Recruiters—Completed (pilot convening has already been conducted)
 - Recruit Training—Preliminary designing is in progress (including conceptual planning for new training aids and a culminating event)
 - Company Commanders—Preliminary designing is in progress (An Electronic Performance Support System has been developed)
 - CPO Academy—Completed (initial convening is in progress)
- b. Establishment of the Nonrate Advisory Committee (two meetings have been held)
- c. Company Commander screening improvements (next group of prospective CCs will initially go to Cape May in TAD status to allow for personal assessment before permanent assignment)
- d. Senior Enlisted Needs Assessment (planning in progress with first meeting slated for early 1999)
- e. Training Analysis System (in final stages of development at Cape May)
- f. Redesigned Enlisted Performance Evaluation Forms (being addressed through the Enlisted Advancement Study Team)
- g. Analysis of the Performance-Based Qualification system (some preliminary work has been done; analysis will begin in earnest in JAN 99)

G-WT
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19 Nov 98

FIRST ENDORSEMENT on MCPOCG memo 1000 of 26 Aug 98

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3. Forming a team to help coordinate and integrate the follow-on development of ECDP recommendations is a logical next step and I will do so under my immediate direction. Obviously, much work remains to fully analyze the practical details and resources involved in executing specific recommendations. I confess to reservations with several recommendations associated with the Recruit-Training curriculum and the role of company commanders. Recruit Training remains a military indoctrination program and instills military discipline, an essential component of this regime. Our company commanders and the Cape May staff on the whole do an exceptional job. Changes need to be managed carefully so as to build on what is already working and not impair our largely successful training efforts. Other recommendations for policy changes will require similar scrutiny. In enclosure (1) to this endorsement, I have tabulated the principal ECDP recommendations. Many costs remain to be quantified and progress in certain areas will depend upon availability of resources.

4. As RADM Ames stated in a recent G-W all-hands session, "We need to continue enabling the Coast Guard through human performance technology (HPT); it is critical to our organization's future." The ECDP is prima facie evidence for the utility of HPT and I am proud of the role that HPT has played in what is clearly a landmark initiative for leadership and performance development of the enlisted workforce.

T. J. BARRETT

Encl: (1) Initial Resource Estimates

Copy: Master Chief Petty Officer of the Coast Guard

Final Report:
United States Coast Guard
Enlisted Career Development Program
Preparing the Enlisted Workforce for the 21st Century

Executive Summary

Introduction:

During the past year and a half, three analysis teams conducted the most sweeping set of studies of the enlisted workforce in Coast Guard history. Taken together, these analyses comprise an integrated and comprehensive performance support plan for the entire Coast Guard enlisted workforce from the time of initial accession to advancement to chief petty officer. The three component studies listed below are collectively entitled the Enlisted Career Development (ECD) Program:

- The Nonrate Workforce Structure Study (NWSS)
 - The Petty Officer Development Initiative (PODI)
 - The Chief Petty Officer Needs Assessment (CPONA)


These ECD studies were inherently customer-focused by virtue of the study teams' composition; team members were selected because they best reflected the immediate beneficiaries of this project. These handpicked men and women came from operational units around the Coast Guard. Moreover, at every step specific data were gathered from actual customers at large. The study teams identified the Coast Guard's organizational goals and missions and corresponding unit needs in order to target the desired performance of the enlisted Workforce to accomplish those goals and missions.

In addition to the three studies above, a fourth effort was launched to communicate and validate this collection of analyses. This effort was known as the Enlisted Leadership Initiatives Training and Professional Development Focus Group (ELITE) project. ELITE entailed an unparalleled series of visits to field commands, both large and small, throughout the Coast Guard to communicate the studies' purposes, findings, and recommendations to the Service at large and to conduct focus groups to gather feedback. As a result, nearly 10,000 Coast Guard men and women have already been personally briefed on the ECD projects and have provided virtually unanimous support for their results.

No large organizational initiatives of this kind in recent memory have been so thoroughly vetted at the grassroots level. This executive summary provides an overview of the background, methodology, and findings associated with these studies.

Background:


The three studies were not conceived at the outset as a comprehensive ECD effort to define enlisted performance from initial entry to chief. Rather, the NWSS and the CPONA began as separate attempts to better develop discrete portions of the enlisted workforce and the PODI was a natural byproduct of these two analyses. As the NWSS analyzed the enlisted accession process up to A-school and the CPONA defined performance expectations of chiefs, needs associated with the intermediate rates virtually spilled out of these two studies. These petty officer needs were captured in the PODI by a team composed of members who were participants in both the NWSS and the CPONA. Put simply, while the NWSS defined one end of the spectrum (E-1 – E-4), the CPONA defined the other end (E-6 – E-7), and the PODI defined the bridge between them (E-4 – E-6).



The NWSS was the first of the ECD studies to be chartered; it began as a successor to a Quality Action Team that had been wrestling with the issue of ensuring that nonrates were engaged in “meaningful” (i.e., career developing and challenging) work. To figure this out, it was clear to the QAT that there first must be a solid understanding of the Service’s expectations for the role and job of a nonrate.

What is it that nonrates ought to be doing in order to help accomplish their units' missions? What qualities do they need to have in order to reach their full potential? It was clear that the answers to these questions would then provide the perfect opportunity to examine precursory issues: given these expectations for nonrates, how do we recruit the kind of people we need to become nonrates and how should we then indoctrinate and assimilate them into the Service?

Thus was conceived the Nonrate Workforce Structure Study which was to provide a comprehensive analysis of the entire Coast Guard enlisted accession system that encompasses what has been called “the three-team commitment” of Recruiting, Recruit Training, and On-The-Job Performance of Nonrates (at their first units). To meld these three elements into a unified accession system, the NWSS examined and linked all of the processes and products associated with these elements from initial attraction of potential Coast Guard applicants to their development as fully functioning nonrates in the field.




NWSS found what many had already suspected, that the accession system was not completely aligned in providing its final product—entry-level enlisted members ready to perform their duties in the field and prepared to reach their full potential in the Coast Guard. The solutions proposed by NWSS will enable all three components of the enlisted accession system to work together for this common purpose.

As NWSS sought to understand the extent to which nonrate work is career enhancing, larger questions arose such as what do we mean by “career”?

What does this career look like? One must know what the job entails at the far end of the enlisted career pipeline if one is to determine how to march in that direction from the career outset as a nonrate. As it happened, another enlisted workforce analysis appeared to have the answers.

That analysis was the Chief Petty Officer Needs Assessment, which focused on the other end of the enlisted spectrum at the point where enlisted technicians at the E-6 level become front-line “shop managers” at the E-7 level. Like the NWSS, this study began with the end state in mind by asking, what is it that the Coast Guard expects of its CPO corps and what professional preparation does a selected E-6 need to fulfill these expectations? The CPONA was chartered partly in response to concerns that emanated from Leadership Workgroups 1 & 2 and the 1996 Training Infrastructure Study. These groups identified changes needed to better support the Chiefs Corps, a key element of which involves the CPO Academy. While the Academy’s curriculum met the needs of E-8’s and E-9’s, not all E-7’s, let alone *prospective* E-7’s, were guaranteed an opportunity to benefit from the CPO Academy experience. The CPONA sought to better align the Academy’s curriculum with real-world senior enlisted performance expectations at the E-7 level.




By analyzing the performance requirements and expectations of newly advanced CPOs, the CPONA team was able to contrast this with actual knowledge, skills, attitudes and abilities of prospective E-7’s (selected E-6’s) to measure the extent of the “jump” from petty officer to chief.

This enabled restructuring of the CPO Academy curriculum to bridge the gap between E-6 and E-7—paygrades with dramatically different performance expectations. In 1994, Leadership Workgroup 1 first


articulated the vision of the CPO Academy as gateway into the Chiefs Corps; CPONA would turn that vision into reality.

Finally, as NWSS and CPONA took shape, it became apparent that these analyses provided two anchors to an entire enlisted developmental plan from prospective enlistee to CPO. In other words, once the roles and performance of both nonrates and chiefs are defined, then the paygrades in between should incorporate successive levels of development from nonrate to chief. All that was lacking was a sequence of developmental building blocks from one to the other.




Defining this sequence became the mission of the Petty Officer Development Initiative, which looked at the NWSS and CPONA as two endpoints that could be connected by strands of professional development for the Petty Officer Corps through E-7.

Career Long Development




The focus group visits comprised the final stage of the studies. This was in direct response to then Chief of Staff VADM Loy's call to communicate and validate the results of the ECD analyses in the field before implementation. The Coast Guard's 1997 Workforce Cultural Audit revealed widespread perceptions that communications from the Service's leadership to the troops was lacking and the ELITE focus groups took proactive measures to ensure that these studies affecting the entire enlisted Workforce were widely publicized before any of their recommendations were enacted. This proved to be an extraordinary opportunity to tap into the collective wisdom of thousands of Coast Guard members resulting in much more finely honed recommendations than would have otherwise been possible.

As a footnote to this background, future plans call for a final analysis in the ECD series to address E-8 and E-9 performance expectations and preparation. Once completed, this Senior Enlisted Needs Assessment (SENA) will complete the ECD series of plans making it truly a cradle-to-grave development strategy for the enlisted workforce.




As a result of the ECD proposals, previously independent professional growth and training efforts will be harnessed with a variety of new initiatives to provide a coordinated and innovative career development program.




Methodology:

The ECD analyses were conducted by specially selected teams using a Human Performance Technology (HPT) approach. HPT is a set of methods and procedures, as well as a strategy for solving problems and for realizing opportunities related to the performance of people. It can be applied to individuals, small groups, and large organizations. HPT begins by looking at an organization's outcomes, which are based upon its mission, strategy and goals, and then it derives from these the desired workforce performance that will achieve the outcomes. Next, the actual state of workforce performance is captured. By contrasting the actual and desired states, gaps between the two are identified and analyses are conducted to determine root causes of the gaps. These root causes may stem from any of three basic groups of origin: knowledge/skills/attitudes/abilities, motivation/incentives, and the environment/resources. Within these three groups there is a universe of factors that influence human behavior in the production of desired outputs resulting in higher outcomes.




Only when the root cause of a performance gap is properly identified can an appropriate system of interventions be designed and developed to fill the gap.



Subsequent evaluation of the results will monitor the alignment between actual and desired workforce performance to ensure that the original gap remains closed and to detect any newly appearing gaps.

Therefore, rather than serving as a mere snapshot in time, an HPT analysis properly done provides a basis for ongoing assessment of workforce alignment with organizational needs.



Both the NWSS and the CPONA defined these attributes and shortfalls for nonrates and CPOs respectively. For the CPONA, this included:

- Optimal Attributes for CPOs (desired state) - Determined the knowledge, skills, attitudes and abilities required for the 21st century CPO. This list became the goal of all career-long development efforts and provided the specific components on which to measure the success of the program.
- Actual Attributes for PO1's (current state) - Assessed how the current group of first class petty officers about to be promoted compare to our “optimal chief.”
- Gaps (between the two) - Assessed the current gap we must bridge to develop optimal CPOs.

And for the NWSS, this included:

- Optimal Attributes for Nonrates (desired state) - Determined the knowledge, skills, attitudes and abilities required for the 21st century nonrate. This list became the end product of the enlisted accession system and provided the specific components on which to measure the success of the system.
- Actual Attributes for Nonrates (current state) - Assessed how the current population of nonrates compares to the “optimal nonrate.”
- Gaps (between the two) - Assessed the current gap we must bridge to develop optimal nonrates.

The NWSS also produced similar lists for both Company Commanders and Recruiters. Subsequent root cause analyses produced numerous recommendations for interventions.

Discussion

NWSS

The Nonrate Study team began with the end in mind by ascertaining precisely what performance is required of a nonrate in the field to enable Coast Guard units to accomplish their missions. Using this data, the team determined those characteristics that recruiters needed to target in order to hire individuals with greatest likelihood of success as members of the enlisted workforce. Then, Recruit Training was redesigned to bridge the

gap between the civilian men and women who enlist and the high-performing nonrates they need to become to do the work of the Coast Guard. As part of this Recruit Training alignment, a thorough needs assessment was conducted for the job of Company Commander. The impact of this alignment and reengineering is immense. As a consequence, a critical portion of the Coast Guard workforce—entry-level enlisted members—will be properly developed to fulfill its intended vital role. This will further affect morale and retention issues with countless benefits that accrue therefrom. The NWSS is empowering to the entry-level enlisted workforce since it identifies and provides for the development of specific knowledge, skills, attitudes, and abilities required of nonrates. This means that the junior enlisted men and women who actually deliver the services provided by the Coast Guard will be truly *Semper Paratus* to protect, defend, and serve the nation's maritime interests.

The NWSS project is without precedent; this represents the first-ever attempt to bring the accession system in alignment with definite, measurable nonrate performance expectations based on organizational and field (customer) needs. The associated data collection and analyses involved nationwide interviewing, surveying, researching, and benchmarking. The analysis team developed systemic interventions and solutions that cross traditional “stovepipe” organizational boundaries so that each accession system component supports the common goal of producing high-performing Coast Guard nonrates. In addition to meeting the mandates of the Government Performance and Results Act (GPRA), the team's data-driven HPT process ensures that its results will address the real barriers to nonrate performance and not merely treat the symptoms. The benefits of the team's revolutionary work ultimately impact the entire Coast Guard enlisted workforce since it affects the way all Coast Guard enlisted members are hired and initially prepared for duty.

In summary, NWSS better defined what the Coast Guard needs from its entry-level enlisted workforce in order to 1) accomplish the Service's missions, and 2) become the future enlisted leaders of the Coast Guard. This definition of performance requirements provided the basis to determine how the Coast Guard ought to recruit young men and women, how these recruits then need to be trained and motivated, and then how the recruit's first units need to continue their development and reinforce what they have learned. This will result in a Coast Guard whose workforce is performance oriented from Day 1—an organization that knows what it needs from its people in order to serve the public and provides what its people need to get the job done. By starting all the way upstream at accession, this professional development, mission focus, and accountability for performance will be imbued throughout the

organization. This, in turn, will enable the processes and infrastructures associated with enlisted recruiting and recruit training to minimize attrition, inefficiencies, and misalignment that consume scarce resources.

The NWSS results are ready for immediate implementation. Already, objectives for three new curricula—for recruiters, recruits, and Recruit Training company commanders—have been designed and await development. If approved, a special implementation team will commence NWSS Phase 3 to tackle the myriad issues involved in executing the study's recommendations.

CPONA

The Chief Petty Officer Needs Assessment (CPONA) conducted a comprehensive review of Chief Petty Officer (CPO) performance expectations and requirements. This needs assessment is vital to the service as it targets the most critical transition point in an enlisted member's career, the point at which the first class petty officer must evolve from a technical expert into a leader and manager worthy of the chief's anchors.

During the course of this project, the CPONA team engaged in an exhaustive data collection and analysis effort, gathering information from hundreds of sources. These data sources included extensive benchmarking of each military service; 12 industry-leading civilian companies; a comprehensive search of relevant literature; 50 interviews with the senior leadership of the Coast Guard; and a myriad of interviews, surveys, and focus groups involving field personnel.

The CPONA team analyzed the varied and complex demands placed on CPOs, synthesized the vast body of data and developed a model of an "optimal" CPO—one who is equipped to meet all those demands. This model is a list of the 115 attributes (knowledge, skills, attitudes, and abilities) that every CPO must possess regardless of rating or assignment.

The team then compared the first class petty officers (PO1's) currently on the list for advancement to E-7 against the model of the optimal CPO by gathering an immense amount of data on the attributes PO1's currently possess. A 360-degree, multiple-rater perspective was captured by surveying supervisors, peers and subordinates of every PO1 on the list. By analyzing the gaps between the actual attributes possessed by those on the list against the optimal model, the team made recommendations on how best to develop the knowledge, skills, attitudes, and abilities before new chiefs arrive at the CPO Academy. Consequently, the CPO Academy

curriculum could be refocused and tailored to better serve the Coast Guard in the next millennium.

The CPONA team went well beyond the impressive achievement of revising the CPO Academy curriculum. Its results provide for a linked development strand combining resident training, on-the-job training, and experience with a comprehensive evaluation and measurement system to gauge the effectiveness of each intervention.

In keeping with the tenets of a performance-based organization, these results add no additional burdens to the workforce and require minimal additional expenses while meshing seamlessly with Coast Guard culture.

PODI

The Petty Officer Development Initiative (PODI), authorized as an adjunct analysis, involved a blending of the NWSS with the CPONA. Using the same rigor and methods as the other studies, the PODI was conducted by a core group of analysts who were members of both of the other studies who recognized that the elements of a PODI plan virtually spilled out of the other studies. Once E-1-to-E-3 and E-7 performance expectations had been defined, it became fairly easy to identify E-4-to-E-6 requirements. In focusing on these intermediate paygrades, the PODI team sought to answer the question, “How do we develop essential knowledge, skills, attitudes, and abilities that cannot be imparted in an existing training experience (such as Recruit Training or CPO Academy) or at any single transition point?” What this team ultimately accomplished, aided by NWSS and CPONA findings, is truly remarkable: the framework for a sweeping program that will revolutionize the Coast Guard’s entire enlisted development process, from the time recruits enter the Service to the time first class petty officers earn their anchors as chiefs.

Like the NWSS and the CPONA, the PODI team’s collection of valid and reliable data included more than the combined amount captured by Leadership Workgroups 1 and 2 and the Workforce Cultural Audit. The team produced a sequential professional development program combining resident and non-resident training, on-the-job training, and experience—all completely consistent with the Service’s Leadership Development Plan (COMDTINST 5351). The team’s results provide mid-grade petty officers a means to learn, practice, develop, and nurture the attributes that will make them successful leaders helping to realize the Commandant’s goal to “build superior competency among our people...and instill superior leadership and management skills at all levels.”

The PODI contributes mightily to a career-long investment in our enlisted workforce. The results, developed as a complete and systemic solution set, will help to make the Coast Guard the employer of choice for young people by improving morale and retention for these “forgotten” paygrades.

ELITE

The focus group tour was a unique and powerful demonstration of the degree to which the organization values its most important asset—its people. The mission of the focus group team was to engage in open, face-to-face dialogue with group units concerning the ECD Program. The team was well received throughout its travels and the concept of a comprehensive enlisted career development plan was heartily endorsed by the members who participated in the presentation and focus groups.

The team used a PowerPoint presentation to convey its information to the group units so that all units received the same message. To appreciate the enormous undertaking involved in the ECD needs assessments, the field had to have a full understanding of who comprised the teams and how they employed Human Performance Technology to reach their conclusions. The field representatives’ confidence in the studies was greatly bolstered by the fact that the ECD teams consisted of field members like themselves of diverse backgrounds who they could instantly relate to. Once the team won their audience’s confidence, it proceeded to give an overview of HPT followed by an outline of the studies and their recommendations. The recommendations generated a great deal of excitement and provoked much discussion that produced some excellent suggestions. This kind of input from the group enhanced the final products of the ECD efforts.

Following the PowerPoint briefings at each unit visited, the team conducted focus groups composed of 12 to 20 participants of various ranks and ratings. Seeking field input in this way established a sense of shared ownership as the members realized that they were part of the process. The focus groups not only validated the data of the studies but also enriched many of their recommendations.

Epilogue:

The ECD studies are complete, the field has been briefed, and now it is time for action. In the focus groups, the team always asked one final question of the participants: “Do you see any barriers in making these changes happen?”

The number one response was not some content related concern regarding the studies; instead, it was general apprehension that the ECD recommendations would not be implemented.

Expressing this pervasive doubt, one field member remarked, “We (the CG) do a great job taking care of the American Public, but a poor job taking care of ourselves.” And another attendee remarked, “Don’t kid us that you’re really going to use any of this information.”

The implementation of these studies is an opportunity for the organization to dispel such cynicism and stoke an underlying confidence and pride among its people. We must keep the faith with the young SA who after she attended a focus group presentation stated, “(This program) really gives me hope about my future in the Coast Guard.” The focus group visits revealed a widely held belief that the Coast Guard is indeed the “World’s Premier Maritime Service” with an understanding that it’s people, not cutters, boats or aircraft, that make this so. Our members want to be challenged and are eager to do the work of the Coast Guard if we’ll just give them the wherewithal. Enacting the ECD program is a sound business decision and will have a lasting positive impact in terms of enlisted workforce development, performance, morale and retention. If we truly believe that “Preparation Equals Performance,” then we must believe that the ECD Program, by better preparing the “Guardians of the Sea,” will ultimately benefit all Americans who depend on our Service. A complete set of recommendations associated with the ECD studies is provided in enclosure (1). All supporting data will be digitally stored for use by those involved in implementation efforts.

Signed:

CAPT J. B. Willis (G-WTT)
Guidance Team Leader
NWSS

CAPT B. Abiles (G-WTL)
Guidance Team Leader
CPONA and PODI

MCPOCG V. W. Patton III (G-CMCPO)
Guidance Team Co-Leader
CPONA and PODI

Encl: (1) ECD Recommendations for Implementation

Final Report:
United States Coast Guard
Enlisted Career Development Program
Preparing the Enlisted Workforce for the 21st Century

Recommendations for Implementation

This is a summary of recommendations resulting from the research and analysis of the following studies and subsequent service-wide focus groups:

- Nonrate Workforce Structure Study (NWSS)
 - Company Commander Needs Assessment (CCNA)
 - Petty Officer Development Initiative (PODI)
 - Chief Petty Officer Needs Assessment (CPONA)

The summary is divided into 7 sections that parallel career progression sequence from time of initial entry to advancement to senior enlisted levels: 1) Recruiting, 2) Recruit Training, 3) Company Commanders, 4) First-Unit Performance, 5) Petty Officers, 6) Chief Petty Officers, and 7) General Recommendations. Each of the sections is further subdivided into functional areas containing individual, databased recommendations.

Before reading the recommendations, it is important to understand the following points:

- a) Coast Guard enlisted, officer, and civilian personnel have been doing a great job in recruiting, training, and developing our enlisted workforce. What they have lacked is a comprehensive program that ties their efforts together and robust data upon which to make decisions. This package fills both of those needs.
- b) All the recommendations are databased and are written in a forthright and frank manner so that their meaning is clear. If at any time the reader infers that they suggest past wrongdoings, please reread point a.

Section 1 Recruiting

These recommendations resulted from the NWSS, Phase 2. Many of these recommendations are predicated on NWSS research and analysis that identified core competencies—knowledge, skills, attitudes and abilities (KSAA's)—that are needed to be a successful recruiter. Others stem from systemic or environmental obstacles in achieving desired recruiting outcomes. These core competencies, combined with an analysis of the current selection process and job incentives, provided the basis for a coordinated set of recommendations to assist the Service in attracting and selecting the best-qualified people for the job of recruiter. The findings and recommendations are organized into the following subsections: Recruiter Selection and Development, Recruiting Organization and Structure, Recruiting Support/Tools, Marketing Programs and Incentives, and Removing Barriers.

1.a. Recruiter Selection and Development

1.a.1. New Resident-Based Recruiter Training Curriculum: Identification of recruiter core competencies revealed gaps in the current process of training and qualifying recruiters. With the assistance of the Recruiter School Chief and several experienced recruiters, the NWSS team developed new resident-training terminal performance objectives (TPO's) to target recruiter needs. Two significant areas of improvement involve sales/marketing and setting realistic expectations. The value of sales/marketing is obvious, and setting realistic expectations is an essential factor in creating motivation. Having an accurate picture of CG life is a crucial part of recruit/nonrate motivation; this must be coupled with an expectation to succeed and a belief in the value thereof. Thus, recruiters must set accurate and relevant expectations early for prospects. This will require a shift in recruiter training from the present emphasis on a recruit's experience in Recruit Training (first 8wks) to a focus on his/her career (4+yrs). The Recruiter C-School curriculum should be redesigned to incorporate all new resident-based TPO's.

1.a.2. New PQS for Recruiters: Recruiters should be provided with on-the-job PQS based on non-resident TPO's derived from recruiter core competencies. The KSAA's that are not covered by the resident-based training course will be covered in this new PQS. Recruiter PQS will be provided to the Recruiter after attending resident based training and should be completed within six months of arrival at the recruiting office.

1.a.3. Remove Assignment Barriers: Motivation and incentive barriers must be minimized to attract the best candidates to this profoundly influential job. In addition to the following recommendations, the Enlisted Advancement Study Team (EAST) should investigate ways to eliminate harmful effects on advancement from this out-of-specialty assignment:

- 1.a.3.a) Assignment preference for follow-on assignment,
- 1.a.3.b) Academic credit for Recruiter C-School,
- 1.a.3.c) SDAP at least on a par with other Services,

1.a.3.d) Allowances for uniform/dry cleaning/haircuts

1.a.4. Screening of Recruiter Candidates: Aptitude interviews (such as those developed by the Gallup Organization) should be used in screening candidates for the job. Attitudinal/psychological instruments should be used to filter out candidates unsuited to sales and marketing work.

1.b. Recruiting Organization and Structure

1.b.1. Relocate Recruiting Offices: Many recruiting offices are not located where they can achieve best results. Recruiting offices should be relocated to areas based on such factors as high population density, minority population density, propensity for military enlistment, and proximity to CG units in order to improve recruiting efficiency and results. Similarly, office staffing should be based on these same variables. Relocation will also provide for more appropriate quota assignment to recruiting offices by tying quota allocations to objective recruiter productivity standards.

1.b.2. CG Recruiting Center (CGRC) Organization: Sectors leaders, supervisors, and support personnel should be located in their geographic sectors instead of CGRC. Lack of direct observation, travel limitations, and time zone differences hinder effective leadership under the current structure. leaders, supervisors, and support personnel could be collocated with CG District offices, activities, groups, etc., to provide additional benefits such as easy access to PERSRU's, clinics, and exchanges.

1.b.3. Organizational Control: The current recruiter measure of success is based on numbers of applicants shipped to Recruit Training. This conflicts with TRACEN Cape May's accountability for numbers of Recruit Training graduates. The current organizational structure (e.g., separate Flag Officers for Recruiting and Recruit Training) exacerbates this problem. Consistent with practices of other Services, both CGRC and Cape May should be accountable to the same Flag Officer for the same results (numbers graduating Recruit Training) to place the emphasis on the common goal of producing nonrates ready for service in the Coast Guard.

1.c. Recruiting Support/Tools

1.c.1. Recruiting Database: Information concerning recruiter and marketing effectiveness is lacking. A database should be developed to track recruiter productivity, return on investment for marketing, etc. to provide for appropriate improvements based upon objective data.

1.c.2. Leverage Technology to increase recruiter effectiveness. Recruiters are currently tied to ineffective "storefront" operations rather than being fully enabled to go where the prospects are. Moreover, in view of the importance of setting realistic expectations (discussed in 1.a.1. above), recruiters need ready access to relevant information whenever and wherever needed. Recommendations include:

1.c.2.a) Maximize recruiter mobility by creating a "virtual office" through use of

cell phones, laptops/modem, etc.

1.c.2.b) Develop a Recruiter Electronic Performance Support System (EPSS) to simplify and streamline the recruiting process while meeting the needs of both the recruiter and the prospect. The EPSS would contain required forms that could be processed on the spot or back at the office enabling recruiters to capture prospect information quickly and professionally. The EPSS would also provide information, pictures and video that can be tailored to the prospect's wants and needs. It would further provide a virtual roadmap for areas of special interest to the prospect (i.e., benefits, jobs, career opportunities, etc.). For example, if a prospect is attracted to the CG due to an interest in flying, the EPSS could lead the prospect through a self-paced tour highlighting aviation job/rating information, required ASVAB scores, career path, CG air frames, geographic assignment information, etc. The technology and software needed to produce this EPSS is 1.c.2.b) (cont'd)

readily available and the use of an electronic "job picture" is an area of much emphasis and innovation among other Services.

1.d. Marketing Programs and Incentives

1.d.1. Align Marketing Programs: Local marketing practices are not aligned with national marketing efforts. All efforts should support one vision; therefore, a standard format and approval process for local marketing plans is required. Marketing products should be geared toward local target populations.

1.d.2. Guaranteed A-School Program should be significantly expanded to allow for earliest possible rating selection/assignment. Currently, CG is alone among Armed Forces in requiring a nonrate tour before career path decision/A-school. NWSS analysis did not find that nonrates benefit from delayed rating affiliation. In addition, evidence suggests that it is a corporate myth that nonrates make pure, unbiased career-choice decisions by being exposed to various ratings during the first tour. To the contrary, the rating choice is unduly influenced by the supervisor, a desire to minimize sea duty, etc. Moreover, current practice discounts aptitudes, long-term career decision-making, and inhibits matching entry-level people to forecasted ratings needs. Associated possibilities are:

1.d.2.a) General guaranteed A-school recruitment with 6-year contracts.

1.d.2.b) Establishment of a smaller "unaffiliated" nonrate pool, similar to that of the Navy, composed of those who will serve in what we consider our traditional nonrate first-tour assignments under a 4-year contract. This pool is to fill required nonrate assignments and is for those who do not make a career choice, are unable to qualify for a desired rating, or are otherwise unable to get a slot in a rating of choice.

1.d.2.c) Establishing a core-and-strand approach in Recruit Training, similar to that of the Navy, that branches into separate tracks for A-school-bound recruits and those that are "unaffiliated" after a common indoctrination period.

1.d.3. Involve All of Team Coast Guard in Recruiting: Institute an "Every-Coastie-is-

a-Recruiter” program. Emphasize that recruiting is everyone’s responsibility, not the job of a few specialists. In conjunction:

1.d.3.a) Permissive Orders: Allow units to provide 1-day permissive orders to members on leave for recruiting purposes (e.g., visits to high schools, civic groups, etc.).

1.d.3.b) Awards: Authorize Director of CG Recruiting to award the COMDT LOC for voluntary recruiting efforts of members.

1.d.3.c) Available Materials: Have standard pre-prepared package of recruiting materials available to participants.

1.d.3.d) Ensure feedback/evaluation system to gauge ROI for this program.

1.d.3.e) Field unit assistance to recruiters should be formally established as a vital Service mission.

1.d.4. Strengthen ties between G-CP (Public Affairs) and CGRC. Establish PA billets in recruiting offices to improve professionalism of marketing/communications in recruiting operations.

1.e. Removing Barriers

1.e.1. Better management of applicants in a “caretaker” status could significantly reduce pre-shipping attrition. Shortening or eliminating this period or making changes to effectively prepare applicants for Recruit Training will result in greater retention of qualified applicants thereby improving recruiter throughput. Both of these options should be further explored in follow-up analysis.

1.e.2. Review and Validate Medical Standards: Medical Standards are inconsistently applied at pre-enlistment MEPS screening and post-enlistment Recruit Training screening; this results in costly, otherwise avoidable attrition after arrival at Recruit Training. Presently, the CG spends \$1M/yr for MEPS screening for which the CG may not be getting full value. Standard, consistently applied medical criteria should be based on a complete review of the Coast Guard’s needs.

Section 2 Recruit Training

NWSS (Phase 1) research and analysis identified knowledge, skills, attitudes and abilities (KSAA's) required of nonrates. These attributes of the ideal nonrate, defined by both the organization and the field at large, provide a solid foundation for Recruit Training that will prepare these entry-level members for their first assignment and for a successful career of Coast Guard service. By encouraging recruits to see themselves as Coast Guard men and women, the new curriculum will build one of the most important foundations for career-long performance and motivation—Identity Formation. Toward this end, the recommended changes to the curriculum are significant—not only in *what* recruits are trained in, but even more so in *how* they are trained. The duration of the new Recruit Training curriculum should be commensurate with curriculum redesign; this up-front investment is too important to be driven by arbitrary time constraints (pre-design estimated duration is 8-10 weeks). The recommendations are organized into the following subsections: The Curriculum, Career Planning, and Supporting Elements.

2.a. The Curriculum

2.a.1. **Complete Recruit Training Process Redesign**: By threading new learning objectives throughout the Recruit Training experience, rather than employ the historical test-and-forget method, development and implementation of associated training will be dramatically improved. Training objectives will no longer be conveyed in discrete segments, but will be imparted throughout Recruit Training to enable recruits to internalize knowledge, develop skills, form attitudes, and acquire abilities needed to embark on a successful career. **Motivation—a New Approach**: The data shows that there is a significant gap between what field supervisors expect and what some nonrates demonstrate in terms of general motivation. Supervisors regard motivation as the “most important” of all nonrate attributes or skills. Motivation can be significantly influenced by the way in which training is conducted. The driving goal of Recruit Training must be to build future CG members, not to tear down former civilians—building motivation, rather than probing for weaknesses, must be behind every facet of Recruit Training. Recommend revamping Recruit Training instruction to impart new TPO's in the manner described above.

2.a.2. **Theme-Based Recruit Training**: Recruit Training should be infused with pervasive themes including Values, Pride, History, Heroes, and CG Culture—i.e., Motivation, Assimilation, Identity Formation as a member of the CG. These must be reinforced outside of Recruit Training at field units. Just as USMC Basic Training revolves around a set of historical events and heroes, the CG curriculum should focus on actual CG heroes and endeavors, past and present. By emphasizing the values that they exemplify, the challenges that they overcame, and the legacy that they have left for the new recruits to build upon, Recruit Training can effect in each recruit a personal transformation anchored in heritage. Such a transformation is paramount to skills development at this stage—being the right person will lead to doing the right thing. Recommend incorporation of these themes and methods into Recruit Training.

2.a.3. Culminating Event: Based on optimal KSAA's and the themes discussed above, a culminating event should be instituted in Recruit Training. This (USMC) Crucible-/(USN) Battle Stations-like experience would forge and refine the concepts above. More than a "final exam," this event is the defining moment at which a recruit makes the transformation to "Guardian of the Sea."

2.a.4. New Training Aids: Recommend providing various new training aids needed to support new Recruit Training skills development. A key training aid involves a ship mock-up (similar to that used by the Navy at TRACEN Great Lakes) for high-fidelity, all-weather, performance-based seamanship and watchstation training. A rough order-of-magnitude cost to construct this mockup is approximately \$600K. Another option is using a decommissioned cutter as a static display platform. Although docking spaces may be an issue, possible rough cost would amount to approximately \$250K annually, not including transit and shore-tie costs.

2.a.5. Fitness/Wellness Program Redesign: Development must be two-pronged: 1) need to train to generic physical standards solidly linked to job requirements, and 2) need to tailor personal program to foster life-long habits that enhance fitness/wellness of recruits individually. The premise is that all recruits need to be physically able to do the job of a nonrate. However, a single standard means that while some are challenged to improve, others are not. The desired state is that all recruits develop an overall fitness and wellness regimen that becomes a personal, lifetime pursuit. Recommend thorough analysis by G-WKH to develop this two-tiered approach.

2.b. Career Planning

2.b.1. Career Expectations: Realistic expectations are critical at every step of the accession system. Since this is a major contributing factor in creating motivation, better career planning in Recruit Training is essential. As a BM3 noted during a focus group, "We can't spend enough time helping people make smart career decisions." Recommendations in support of this include:

2.b.1.a) Electronic library/computer lab should be established at Cape May to provide complete and current information on careers and career growth requirements and opportunities.

2.b.1.b) Force Manager involvement needs to be institutionalized in Recruit Training to ensure the most current and accurate rating information possible is available to recruits.

2.b.1.c) The sponsorship program needs to be overhauled. Recommend including the latest and complete unit/geographical data in electronic library mentioned above. Also, Cape May should maintain active liaison between Recruit Training staff and units that will receive graduates.

2.b.1.d) E-3 courses should be distributed to all recruits before graduating from Recruit Training rather than after reporting to first unit.

2.b.2. Move FN vs. SN decision to a point as early as possible in Recruit Training. This is closely linked to item 1.d.2. concerning the desirability of front-end rating decisions. In addition,

2.b.2.a) This must be an individual choice (notwithstanding Service needs).

2.b.2.b) This should result in SR's and FR's in Recruit Training.

2.b.3. Graduation Leave: Ensure that recruit graduation leave is adjusted to avoid having nonrates report to first unit on a Fri/Sat/Sun (i.e., "First 72 Hours" concerns).

2.c. Supporting Elements

2.c.1. Establish the Nonrate Advisory Committee (NAC), successor to Enlisted Recruit Training Advisory Committee (ERTAC), as a body that regularly monitors the effectiveness of Recruit Training in developing nonrate performance. In conjunction with a formal charter institutionalizing this role, recommend that the NAC

2.c.1.a) Measure the "product quality" of Recruit Training on a continual basis working in close partnership with the Performance Technology Branch at TRACEN Cape May. To this end, new external evaluations for Recruit Training must be tied directly to the NWSS-established and NAC-monitored nonrate optimals.

2.c.1.b) Ensure that curriculum changes are data-based, predicated on established ideal attributes for nonrates, rather than subjective, reactionary adjustments that will ultimately detract from the real business of Recruit Training. Any new performance objectives must be the result of new nonrate optimals.

2.c.2. Relocating SN and FN Force Managers under G-WTL, rather than G-OCU and G-SRF respectively, would shift their emphasis more toward development rather than operations/engineering. This change in focus would be appropriate and beneficial for these entry-level enlisted members.

Section 3 Company Commanders

The findings and recommendations of this section were derived from CCNA, the research and analysis of which identified core competencies that are required of a successful Company Commander (CC). The CC is the single most important variable in the Recruit Training equation. This position is too critical to be filled by anyone representing less than “the best”; recruits must be “imprinted” with only the best of CG role models. In this regard, it is one of the most important jobs in the Coast Guard. The findings and recommendations are organized into the following subsections: CC Selection and Development and Structure and Resources.

3.a. CC Selection and Development

3.a.1. New Roles: Overemphasis on the CC’s role as disciplinarian is counterproductive to their motivational mission. Instead, the CC should be thoroughly prepared to serve in multiple roles as coach, role model, instructor, supervisor, expert, career counselor, *and* disciplinarian.

3.a.2. New techniques and models should be employed by CC’s to better motivate, socialize, and instill Coast Guard values in new recruits. These new motivation and socialization models, based on established principles and current research, move the motivation/socialization process from a short-term behaviorist model to a long-range eclectic model.

3.a.3. New Resident-Based CC Training Curriculum: The CC C-School curriculum should be redesigned to incorporate all new resident-based TPO’s recommended by the CCNA. Identification of CC core competencies revealed gaps in the current process of training and qualifying CC’s. The CCNA developed completely new resident-training TPO’s to target identified CC needs. This proposed redesign of CC training will better link development of CC knowledge, skills, attitudes, and abilities to the new Recruit Training TPO’s and will prepare CC’s for their new roles and methods discussed above.

3.a.4. New PQS for CC’s: CC’s should be provided with on-the-job PQS based on non-resident TPO’s derived from the CC core competencies.

3.a.5. Screening of CC’s: Aptitude interviews (such as those developed by the Gallup Organization) should be used in screening candidates for the job. Attitudinal/psychological instruments should be used to filter out candidates unsuited to the unique requirements of this job.

3.a.6. An annual training camp should be conducted for personal assessment/screening of candidates before commencing company commander school.

3.a.7. Fully-Qualified Status. Reassign (vice recirculate) company commanders who fail to qualify. Company commander billets must be filled with fully qualified members. Reassign company commanders who lose their quals for cause.

3.a.8. Remove Assignment Barriers: Motivation and incentive barriers must be minimized to attract the highest caliber candidates to this profoundly influential job. In addition to the following recommendations, the Enlisted Advancement Study Team (EAST) should investigate ways to eliminate harmful effects on advancement from this out-of-specialty assignment:

- 3.a.8.a) Assignment preference for follow-on assignment,
- 3.a.8.b) Academic credit for company commander C-school,
- 3.a.8.c) SDAP at least on a par with other Services,
- 3.a.8.d) Allowances for uniform/dry cleaning/haircuts

3.b. Structure and Resources

3.b.1. An Electronic Performance Support System (EPSS), providing clear policy, procedures, and advice anytime day or night, should be provided to company commanders along with other necessary resources and problem-solving tools.

Section 4 First-Unit Performance

The NWSS analysis identified the knowledge, skills, attitudes, and abilities that nonrates should possess upon graduating from Recruit Training as well as those that they should develop at the first unit after entering the field. This allows for a proper division of responsibility of nonrate development between Recruit Training and field units.

Nevertheless, it is the responsibility of the entire CG to continue in the development and mentoring of our junior enlisted troops. Our internal communications media, such as “CG Magazine,” should strive to reinforce the themes and objectives imparted at Recruit Training. The first unit in particular must cultivate the seeds planted at Cape May; we must eradicate the mentality that nonrates should “forget everything you learned at Boot Camp.” Subversion of initial indoctrination will undo the best recruit training.

Remember the “Three-Team Commitment”: Recruiting, Cape May, and the First Unit must be full-fledged partners, not disjointed components of accession. Specific first-unit recommendations are included below under the categories of Career Motivation and Development.

4.a. Career Motivation

4.a.1. Eliminate minimum Time-In-Grade (TIG) for E-2 advancement to E-3 since this negatively affects reinforcement of motivation and initiative. As previously discussed, building and reinforcing motivation is a preeminent concern in the development of our most junior people. Arbitrarily holding back advancement of those with high initiative, ambition and performance is counterproductive to this end. We are presently recruiting members directly into the Coast Guard at paygrade E-3 without regard for prerequisite time-in-service requirements.

4.b. Development

4.b.1. New Unit-Specific PQS should replace one-size-fits-all Performance-Based Qualifications for E-3. The NWSS indicated that generic performance qualifications at the E-3 level were impractical due to the predominant emphasis on attitude over skill and the short time elapsed since receipt of Recruit Training.

4.b.2. New SN and FN Courses should be developed to reflect NWSS-defined nonrate on-the-job performance requirements.

Section 5 Petty Officers

Leadership support should be provided where it most counts for nonrates, at the junior petty officer level. As one member noted during a focus group, “Our leadership training is upside down, we train officers but not junior enlisted.” Yet, in reality nonrates have much greater day-to-day dealings with junior enlisted supervisors than with officers. Furthermore, because competencies required of CPO’s cannot all be imparted at the E-6-to-E-7 transition point, they must be the culmination of development all along the way on the career path. This is why the PODI is so crucial in building the foundation at the mid-grade enlisted levels. The PODI prescribed leadership-related performance requirements by matching each of the 21 leadership competencies, established by Leadership Workgroup 2, to the rates in which they become effective. The PODI also prescribed the means for competency development to be provided through appropriate professional growth interventions such as A-schools, Striker Program, General Military Requirements (MRN's) including Performance-Based Qualifications (PBQ's) and knowledge elements of advancement courses. Associated recommendations fall under the heading of Development.

5.a. Development

5.a.1. A-School Leadership Training: An analysis of the A-school leadership program should be conducted to better define actual leadership needs at the E-3 level.

Research consistently indicated that the “leadership” most often affecting nonrate performance is from junior petty officers rather than officers and chiefs. Previous work in this area serves as a good starting point; however, a reassessment is in order since this must be put in context of the entire ECDP progression of professional development.

5.a.2. Strikers and Direct-Accession Petty Officer Leadership Training: Each petty officer candidate, including those who do not attend A-school (i.e., Strikers and Direct-Accession Petty Officers) should be required to complete the same resident-based leadership module as A-school students. All petty officers require this common leadership foundation.

5.a.3. Leadership Training at the E-5 Level: The Leadership and Management School (LAMS) should be retargeted to the E-5 level. This paygrade represents the “forgotten middle” of the enlisted ranks in which the exercise of leadership has traditionally been expected without corresponding leadership development support. LAMS should be structured in resident, exportable, or distance modes as appropriate in order to afford this training to *all* E-5’s upon advancement.

Section 6 Chief Petty Officers

CPONA research and analysis identified knowledge, skills, attitudes and abilities (KSAA's) required of E-7's thereby providing a solid foundation for the CPO Academy. This PODI foundation and the CPONA emphasis on bridging the gap from intermediate to senior enlisted grades will help ensure the best preparation for our senior-most enlisted leadership. Recommendations again fall under the area of Development.

6.a. Development

6.a.1. Develop a Completely New CPO Academy: The CPO Academy's resident-based instruction has been redesigned in conjunction with a shift in the target population from E-8's to new E-7's making the transition from E-6. The new curriculum, based on the optimal KSAA's for CPO's, should serve as "pipeline training" for entry into the Chiefs Corps.

6.a.2. Conduct a Senior Enlisted Needs Assessment (SENA): The SENA project should be funded and implemented to complete the ECDP series at the top end of the enlisted spectrum. This study should also develop the requirements for the Command Master Chief and Career Information Specialist programs and ensure they are in compliance with Public Law 85-422 422 (which established the E-8 and E-9 paygrades) while meeting the needs of the Coast Guard.

Section 7 General Recommendations

Finally, this section contains recommendations that do not fit entirely within one of the six previous sections. They are recommendations that surfaced very clearly in the ECDP analyses, but apply throughout the entire enlisted spectrum.

7.a. Create a basic HR database to capture information that will allow the CG to make sound business decisions to reverse harmful trends or enhance positive influences. Examples of invaluable information that must be collected and tracked over time include: reasons for enlistment, reasons for recruit attrition, reasons for RELAD (at every level), reasons for reenlistment (at every level), etc. Structured data will enable course corrections based on objective, rather than anecdotal, evidence.

7.a.1. Training Analysis System (TAS): On a related note, we should support continued development of the TAS at Cape May to allow for multi-variable analysis of factors that indicate propensities and predictors for success or failure throughout the accession system.

7.b. Continue to Improve Mentoring Program: Conduct a needs assessment and create an evaluation mechanism for this program. Repeatedly, the Mentoring program surfaced in the focus groups. Widespread confusion about the current program, in the face of an obvious need for mentoring relationships in the development process, indicates the need for greater clarity and accessibility in order for this program to broadly help more of our people.

7.c. Guaranteed Striker billets should be greatly expanded. This would be a significant recruiting tool related to discussion in section 1.d.2. above. All nonrate billets at stations should be striker billets for applicants or SA's/FA's wishing to become BM/MK. If nonrate advances to BM3/MK3 while at a station, do not reassign—allow member to complete tour. This would help remedy the revolving-door problem at stations thus providing for greater stability of the stations' workforce. Stations presently have little incentive to develop nonrates who rotate upon advancement to E-3. If a nonrate is assigned to a station after initial 2yrs. afloat (per existing policy), a minimum 1-yr. follow-on tour length should be required at the station to further improve return on investment for the professional development of nonrates.

7.d. Redesign Enlisted Performance Evaluation Forms (EPEF's) to reflect optimal (KSAA's) defined by NWSS and CPONA. Task the Enlisted Advancement Study Team (EAST) with ensuring this basic linkage between the performance we require/expect and that which we evaluate.

7.e. Analyze the CG Personnel Qualifications Standards (PQS) and Job Qualification Requirements (JQR) system to ensure consistent and coordinated oversight. This alignment should be at both the organization and job level; written policy should clearly outline and support organization-wide performance requirements, and PQS tasks should be directly linked to a member's job performance. Furthermore, the analysis should

7.e. (cont'd) identify gaps in PQS/JQR standardization and qualification criteria at the unit level. Finally, the analysis should provide recommendations concerning database management identifying the ideal method and means to capture, store, and retrieve a member's record of personal qualifications as they progress in their career.

7.f. Analyze the Enlisted Ratings Performance-Based Qualification (PBQ) System: A complete overhaul of this system is required; the current system provides no standard way to create or revise a PBQ associated with a rating. The system is inflexible and inadequate with numerous problems involving sign-off procedures, qualifications waivers, access to quals-related equipment, old technologies, etc. As the means by which we document the performance requirements of each rate and rating, PBQ's are a critical element of our Human Resources System. An analysis to reengineer the system—leading to new procedures to create, change, complete, sign off, and document PBQ's—should be conducted to ensure a completely performance-based set of quals (PBQ's) for every rating.

7.g. Redesign of Non-Resident-Based Military Requirements (MRN) Courses: The MRN system for developing Coast Guard knowledge is not adding value in its current form. MRN's provide an opportunity to have our members study important information for their own development and for instilling our history and culture. Recommend developing MRN courses that have been designed for all levels E-3 to E-7, anchored by NWSS and CPONA optimals, with each successive module building upon the previous modules. These should be compiled in a single-source MRN reference to be distributed to all enlisted members of all paygrades (similar to USAF handbook).

7.h. MRN Performance-Based Qualifications (PBQ's) should be changed for E-3 to E-7 by designing new on-the-job PBQ's that develop toward mastery of the prerequisite skills for a chief. In conjunction with this, MRN-PBQ performance checklists should be developed for the units to use as sign-off job aids that provide examples of what performances should include.

7.i. Review Nonrate Billets. A sub-team of the NWSS, working with representatives of Workforce Planning (G-WR-2), studied nonrate occupational analysis data and identified the amount of work done by nonrates that is unproductive to their career development. This work primarily involves janitorial, grounds-keeping, and data-entry activities at non-afloat units. Based on a unit-specific conversion of work hours to FTE, about 275 billets were identified as candidates for reprogramming by finding alternative sources for the non-career-oriented work. Recommend that the appropriate Program/Facility Managers review the work-hour conversions and assess feasibility (including cost effectiveness of alternative sources of labor) of reprogramming nonrate billets in question.

7.j. Establish a HQ Implementation Team for all ECDP implementation efforts. The team would be charged with oversight, coordination, and integration of all ECDP recommendations approved for implementation. The Performance Consulting Division (G-WTT-1), having served as overall planner, coordinator, and leader of the ECDP analyses, should develop a charter for this team complete with resource requirements needed to implement approved recommendations.